System Description (SOC 2)¶
Purpose. The description of the system required for a SOC 2 examination — what the service is, its boundaries, the infrastructure and data that support it, and the control environment around it. The auditor reads this alongside the control matrix; it is the narrative the report is built on. Also serves ISO clause 4.3 (scope) and control CC2.3.
Status: DRAFT. Facts verified against the live AWS environment on 2026-08-08. Items still being remediated are stated plainly in §7 — a Type 1 description is expected to describe the system as it is, not as intended.
1. Company and service¶
Soon Technologies B.V. (KvK 75939401, Herengracht 420, 1017 BZ Amsterdam; incorporated 26-09-2019) provides Soon, a cloud-based Workforce Management (WFM) SaaS: employee scheduling, time & attendance, leave management, and AI-assisted forecasting and auto-scheduling.
Customers are organisations that use Soon to plan and manage their own workforce. Soon acts as a GDPR data processor for the personal data those customers put into the platform; the customer is the controller.
The company is privately held, founder-run and fully remote — four founders (Olaf Jacobson, Thomas Picauly, Melvin Jacobson, Alessandro Cardinali) plus one external security consultant. Soon operates no offices and no data centres.
2. Scope of this description¶
In scope — the core production platform:
| Component | Description |
|---|---|
soon-server |
Core WFM backend API (production) |
frontend |
Customer-facing web application |
solver / soon-intrasolver |
Auto-scheduling and optimisation engines |
soon-integrations, soon-connect |
Integrations with third-party platforms |
| Supporting AWS infrastructure | Compute, database, storage, networking, monitoring (§4) |
Out of scope: internal-only services (e.g. soon-seer), the devops tooling
repository, and corporate IT beyond what supports the platform. Rationale recorded in
Context & Scope (ISMS-DOC-04-1).
Trust Services Criteria: Security (Common Criteria CC1–CC9) only. Availability, Processing Integrity, Confidentiality and Privacy are not in scope for this examination.
Type: SOC 2 Type 1 — design and implementation of controls at a point in time.
3. The data Soon processes¶
| Data | Examples | Classification |
|---|---|---|
| Customer workforce personal data | Employee names, emails, schedules, worked hours, leave, availability | Restricted |
| Customer account & configuration | Tenant settings, roles, permissions, integration config | Confidential |
| Authentication data | Credentials, tokens, session and SSO identifiers | Restricted |
| Billing data | Subscription and invoice records (card data is held by Stripe; Soon stores no PAN) | Restricted |
| Operational telemetry | Application and infrastructure logs, error traces (may incidentally contain personal data) | Confidential |
Soon does not process special-category data by design. Full inventory: Information Asset Inventory.
4. Infrastructure¶
Verified in AWS account 742816139593, region eu-west-1 (Ireland), on 2026-08-08.
| Layer | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Compute | AWS ECS/Fargate, Lambda; container images in ECR |
| Database | AWS RDS MySQL — rds-soon-soon-prod (production), rds-soon-soon-dev (development). Storage encrypted at rest (AES-256, KMS); automated daily snapshots, 7-day retention |
| Storage | AWS S3 — account-level Block Public Access enabled (2026-08-08) |
| Frontend delivery | Netlify / Cloudflare (CDN, TLS, WAF/edge protection) |
| Network | AWS VPC with security groups; TLS 1.2+ terminated at AWS-managed load balancers |
| Identity | WorkOS for enterprise SSO/SAML (Entra ID, Okta, Google Workspace); Google Workspace for internal identity |
| Monitoring & detection | AWS CloudWatch (metrics, alarms, logs), Sentry (application errors), AWS GuardDuty (threat detection over CloudTrail, DNS, VPC flow logs, S3 data events, RDS login events, EBS malware) |
| Audit logging | AWS CloudTrail |
| Source & CI/CD | GitHub (SoonHQ) — protected main, pull-request review, CI checks, Dependabot, code and secret scanning |
| IaC | OpenTofu/Terraform (migration in progress under Linear S-342) |
Data residency: customer data is stored in the EU (AWS eu-west-1). One known exception — Intercom (customer support) currently runs on US infrastructure; migration to EU hosting is tracked as Linear S-303.
5. Sub-processors¶
| Sub-processor | Purpose | Personal data |
|---|---|---|
| AWS | Cloud infrastructure (EU, Ireland) | All platform data |
| Stripe | Payments and subscriptions | Billing contact data |
| WorkOS | Enterprise SSO/SAML | Authentication identifiers |
| Intercom | Customer support (US-hosted — migration in progress) | Support conversations, contact data |
| Sentry | Error monitoring | Incidental, in stack traces |
| Google Workspace | Internal collaboration | Data handled by staff |
| Netlify / Cloudflare | Frontend hosting and delivery | Request metadata |
| AI/LLM providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, Mistral, Deepseek, X.AI) | AI scheduling/assistant features | Under confirmation — see §7 |
6. The control environment¶
- Governance. An ISMS is maintained as version-controlled documentation
(
SoonHQ/isms), with a document register, defined owners and a weekly security meeting. The Information Security Manager (Olaf Jacobson) is accountable for security. - Risk management. A documented risk assessment process and register (28 risks, including explicit fraud scenarios) drives control selection via the Statement of Applicability.
- Access control. Least privilege; MFA required on critical systems (AWS, GitHub) under a documented risk-tiered model; SSO where available; quarterly access reviews.
- Change management. All changes via GitHub pull request with peer review and CI
gates;
mainis protected; infrastructure moving to code. - Operations. Continuous vulnerability scanning (Aikido, Dependabot), centralised logging and alerting, GuardDuty threat detection, documented incident response with a GDPR 72-hour breach-notification procedure.
- People. Confidentiality agreements, security awareness training with a quarterly refresher, documented joiner/mover/leaver process, screening for future hires.
- Monitoring of controls. Independent internal audit (external consultant) plus an
in-house continuous control monitoring system (
soon-grc) that verifies technical controls automatically and collects the evidence — see ISMS-DOC-09-6.
7. Known limitations and remediation in progress¶
Stated openly because a Type 1 description must reflect reality.
| Item | Status |
|---|---|
| ~~Production database endpoint is publicly reachable~~ — CLOSED 2026-08-19 | The public endpoint was removed and the dsync Lambda moved inside the VPC; production CI migrations now run in-VPC as a consequence (soon-server#1675, merged 2026-08-19). Engineers reach the database through SSM Session Manager per ISMS-DOC-A05-37-1. Evidence capture outstanding — PubliclyAccessible: false and the security-group rules must be exported before the audit |
| No dedicated, log-file-validated CloudTrail | A validated trail is to be created; CloudTrail is otherwise active |
| Backup restore never tested; PITR disabled; snapshots not isolated off-account | Linear S-327 |
| No MDM/EDR — all endpoints are privately owned | Compensating control: Device Security Standard with quarterly verifiable attestation |
| Segregation of duties limited — four founders develop, deploy and administer | Detective compensating controls: tamper-evident logging, peer-reviewed change, quarterly access review |
| No native product MFA for email/password customer accounts | SSO/social login offered; native MFA on the roadmap (risk R-22) |
| Intercom US-hosted | EU migration — Linear S-303 |
| AI sub-processor data flows not fully confirmed | Under confirmation (OPEN-QUESTIONS Q8) |
Most ISMS policies are draft (not yet formally approved) |
Approval round in progress |
8. Complementary user entity controls¶
Customers are responsible for: managing their own users and permissions in Soon; choosing and enforcing an authentication method (SSO/social login recommended, since native MFA for email/password accounts is not yet available); the accuracy and lawfulness of the data they enter; and notifying Soon of security concerns via the documented channels.
Related documents¶
- Context & Scope · Information Asset Inventory
- Statement of Applicability · Risk Assessment Report
- SOC 2 Type 1 Readiness · Security Overview
Change log¶
| Version | Date | Author | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0.1 | 2026-08-08 | ISMS | First draft — SOC 2 system description: service, scope and boundaries, data, infrastructure (verified against live AWS), sub-processors, control environment, known limitations, and complementary user entity controls. |